Reflection on Warfighting by the U.S. Marine Corps

               This is another publication by the US Marine Corps, this time focusing on the fighting doctrine of the Corps. I read it to get a better sense of the theory behind how the Marines operate. The book starts with an interesting observation. It is that war and peace exist on a spectrum. Absolute war and absolute peace happen rarely in the real world. War is just an extension of all sorts of policies that can be taken, such as ending diplomatic relations, imposing tariffs or sanctions, or small border clashes. Therefore, the state is always in a continuous relationship with conflict. The doctrine also states that there is no clear difference between the offense and the defense, as a good offense must still take time to consolidate its position and maneuver, which is defensive, and a good defense must counterattack, which is offensive. It reminds me of a game of chess in how both players are constantly on the offensive and defensive.

               There is also advice in the book that applies in situations that have absolutely nothing to do with war. It is written that, “Because we recognize that no two situations in war are the same, our critiques should focus not so much on the actions we took as on why we took those actions and why they brought the results that they did.” I think this is an important quote because when one reviews their performance in any field or endeavor, criticizing one’s own actions is easy, but it is much more effective to think about why one took those actions. We ought to deeply analyze the assumptions we held that caused us to take good and bad actions. Another major part of the philosophy that is useful in civilian life is to emphasize in-person communication as much as possible. Humans don’t just communicate with words, but with intonation, expressions, and body language that are lost on the phone and in writing. After all, high quality information is much better than high quantity information.

               The Marines operate by maneuver warfare. This is opposed to attritional warfare, with maneuver being about “shattering the enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions,” while attritional warfare focuses less on tricking the enemy and more on wearing him down. To do this, the Marines must use decentralized command and focus less on timetables and specific sequences of events and more on creating disorder and taking advantage of critical moments to strike the enemy’s weak points. It is written that, “If we are to win, we must be able to operate in a disorderly environment. In fact, we must not only be able to fight effectively in the face of disorder, we should seek to generate disorder for our opponent and use it as a weapon against him.” Therefore the Marines don’t put too much control in subordinates and don’t strive for certainty. The Marines choose to shape only the general conditions of war, including “canalizing enemy movement in a desired direction, blocking or delaying enemy reinforcements so that we can fight a piecemealed enemy rather than a concentrated one, shaping enemy expectations, or attacking a specific enemy capability to allow us to maximize a capability of our own…” The point is to develop several options for any given moment, so that the officer in charge is not restricted in his or her choices. Then, when the decision must be made, the Marines tell us that, “a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week.” Speed and decisiveness are the crucial principles.