Reflection on The Story of the Jews: Finding the Words, 1000 BCE-1492 CE

               All of my notes and highlighted parts of this book got deleted somehow and that’s really disappointing because I use those as my guide to make these posts and to help me remember the most interesting parts of the book. I’m just realizing now how important this post-book reflection is for me now that I can’t really do it. There were a ton of interesting things in this book and I guess now I just need to read some more on the same subject. This really sucks though because this is one of my favorite books I've read in a long time.

               I’ll just write that my favorite parts of the book were the era before the destruction of the Second Temple, which I want to learn more about, the discussion of the creation of difference between Judaism and Christianity in the fourth century, and the final chapter about the last hundred years of Judaism in Spain. The book has a really good narrative and feels like a novel a lot of the time. The best and most interesting characters in my opinion were Nehemiah, Shmuel ibn Naghera (if I’m spelling that right), and Maimonides. It was a really great book and I wish I could’ve written more about it. There is a volume two about more recent years that I want to check out soon.

Reflection on The Rent is Too Damn High: What to Do About It, and Why It Matters More Than You Think by Matthew Yglesias

               This is a very short book at 57 pages that I read in one day. Matthew Yglesias is a political writer I’ve followed on twitter for a while now so I kind of already knew what the gist of this book would be: he wants American cities to deregulate their zoning laws to allow for taller buildings in places with higher demand and therefore prices. This would make housing more affordable. It’s a very readable book for something about zoning policy and he uses real life examples and metaphors to get his point across. Yglesias writes that, “architects know how to design multifloor buildings and engineers can build elevators. Public policy that restricts their ability to do so—not construction costs, or the limited supply of land—is the main cause of high rents in America.

               Yglesias argues against rent control, as it “helps insiders, but for outsiders the rent will be higher than ever.” This is because it will discourage building more residential buildings, as no one will want to build them if they can’t make the money. Yglesias also effectively disproves the idea that construction prices have risen, quoting a study that find inflation-adjusted prices for building materials in a “modest quality” home have only increased $2.50 from 1950 to 2006. However, the average home in 1950 was just 983 square feet while in 2006 it was 2,349 square feet. He isolated the truly high cost of real estate as the permission to build on the purchased land. Even when one is allowed to build, there may be other restrictions such as a requirement for a certain number of parking spaces that reduce the ability to do so. These high prices force many people to move to cheaper areas rather than places where they can get better, higher paying jobs. Therefore, while people in the middle class are unable to achieve prosperity as easily in Fargo as in Arlington, they are forced to move to a place like Fargo because the cost of entering a place like Arlington is too high. They may move to one of these areas but in a far, outlying suburb. This can work, but causes a longer commute, a cause of obesity and marital strain—Yglesias cites that, “Couples featuring one member with a commute of over forty-five minutes are about 40 percent likelier to split up.” He points out that American cities lack walkable urbanism, being that polls show Americans evenly split on wanting to live in a suburban or urban lifestyle, yet, quoting a Brookings Institution Fellow, “In most metropolitan areas, only 5 to 10 percent of the housing stock is located in walkable urban places.” I think he makes some very good points.

               However, I wonder what would happen if we implemented these policies, increasing the supply of housing and therefore decreasing its price and the cost of rent. This would be better for people who don’t yet have a home and wish to buy one, often young people. It would also be good for renters. It would make no difference for people who are planning to stay in their home until they die. However, it would be very problematic for those who planned to sell their home for a profit. Yglesias points out that it is very strange that we treat homes, unlike any other used good, as something that gains value. Cars, appliances, and most other things all lose value, while homes gain it (because of the stagnant housing supply). However, this is likely no consolation to current homeowners. I also wonder what would happen in financial markets if the idea of housing being a good that always increases in value stops being true. Would it cause a financial collapse? I really don’t know. An alternative could be to build greater transportation networks, expanding cities horizontally rather than vertically. This would probably solve the same problem, but it would cause more urban sprawl, which reduces our land’s natural beauty. It’s a really interesting problem and book, very relevant to the way that most of us live. I definitely would recommend.

Reflection on From Yellow-Dog Democrats to Red-State Republicans: Florida and Its Politics Since 1940 by David L. Colburn

              This book about Florida politics centers around the governors and their initiatives (or lack thereof) to change the state. Through the governors, Colburn tells the tale of how Florida, since World War Two, changed from a Democratic to a Republican stronghold, mainly along the political allegiances of the so called “Yellow-Dog” Democrats, who “would vote for a yellow dog before they’d vote for a Republican,” descended from Scots-Irish Southerners, living in the Panhandle and North Florida. While these “Yellow-Dogs” were consistently Democrats, social, and specifically racial issues turned their party allegiance. In the 1960’s, as national Democrats started to accept racial integration and civil rights for blacks under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Yellow-Dogs in Florida turned tail and either didn’t vote, or voted their first Republican, Claude Kirk, into office in 1966, the first Republican to run Florida since Reconstruction. They would slowly turn more and more Republican despite the failures of the Kirk administration and the embarrassment of Watergate, culminating in the two terms of Jeb Bush after 28 years of Democratic governors with only 4 of Republicans from 1971-1999.

               Despite claiming to begin in 1940, the first Governor whose policies and term was really talked about was LeRoy Collins, the only Southern Governor who accepted integration, a moderate who often remarked that he served all citizens in Florida, not just the whites. However, he was followed by C. Farris Bryant, a segregationist who was the exact opposite, following the other South Democrats who were mostly segregationists. In the aftermath of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Yellow-Dog Democrats morphed into Blue-Dog Democrats, who “claimed they were being choked blue by the leash placed around their necks by the federal government…” These Blue Dogs would vote Republican in Florida in 1966 for Claude Kirk. Their feelings were summed up by George Wallace, a renegade, racist Southern Democrat who ran for the presidency in 1968 asserting that liberal politicians and bureaucrats were the real racists as they sent their children to private schools and moved to suburbs, while poor whites faced the costs of integration and were bussed to formerly black schools. While he certainly was not advocating the right solutions, he touched on something that was a vital truth- the costs of integration were being born by the poorest whites while wealthy liberals in cities congratulated themselves for integrating the South while self-segregating in the North. Business leaders in Florida had turned against segregation when they saw the experience of Arkansas under Governor Orval Faubus, who attempted to block integration at Central High School in Little Rock in 1957, then closing the school in 1958-9 to avoid integration. Many businesses left Arkansas when the state turned violent, making a “deep imprint on the minds of business leaders in Florida.” Many whites in Florida, on the other hand, wanted to maintain segregation to give themselves a leg up in the world over other races, mainly blacks in the south. When it came to busing and school integration, which happened to be carried out more often in ways that affected poorer whites, “White parents saw themselves as victims of society, and the use of their children in a racial experiment angered them greatly.”

               Kirk represented a great success for the Republican Party in Florida but also a major setback, as he “proved ill-equipped by personality, political acumen, and leadership to govern the state effectively.” His segregationist stance won over racist white voters and his rejection of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal won the respect of environmentalists but was erratic and often in the news for his ridiculous statements and became a mockery. In addition, Florida was about to see a generation of truly great Democratic leaders (who the author just loves with all his heart), Reubin Askew, Lawton Chiles, and Bob Graham, three governors and two senators between them, all mentored by LeRoy Collins.

               Elected governor in 1970 and serving from 1971-9, Reubin Askew instituted bussing to integrate schools, solidifying integration in Florida. He faced significant opposition. In a special session in 1972, the Florida Legislature met to create a constitutional referendum against forced bussing. Realizing that legislators would override his veto, Askew put another measure on the ballot asking voters if they supported a quality education for all children and opposed a return to the dual system of white and black public schools. He said, “Bear in mind, there were enough people against it who were racist, but in my opinion, the vast majority of people who fought busing, really were not [necessarily] racially motivated.” He wanted to “give them an opportunity of another vote, but I also wanted to challenge them to think about the [second vote] before they made up their mind on the first vote.” The first vote passed 3 to 1, but the second passed 4 to 1.

               After Askew, political ally Bob Graham won election in 1978 to serve from 1979-87. Like Lawton Chiles, who walked across the state meeting normal citizens (earning the nickname “Walkin’ Lawton”), Graham labored in eight-hour shifts alongside his fellow citizens, calling them “Graham’s Workdays”, building support among working class Floridians. He was very popular and successful, but, throughout his time as governor, Republicans made gains at the grassroots level due to the gradual shift of Yellow Dogs to the Republican Party, the transition of the senior vote to Republicans, as they wanted less taxes now that they had a fixed income (ironically from a socialistic government program), the rapid population growth of families in central and southwestern Florida (traditional Republican strongholds), and the shift of Cuban voters in South Florida to become solidly Republicans. One thing that made Florida different from other Southern states was the large population of senior citizens, who couldn’t care less about school integration and bussing because their grandchildren lived in other states. Graham laid out an agenda of 3 E’s: economic development, education, and the environment. Economic development was obvious to most and environmental protections have been pursued by every Floridian governor, regardless of party, but education became more necessary to help the business side of things as the state’s Chamber of Commerce and business leaders complained that there was a lack of skills among high school graduates, frequently noting that businesses moving to Florida brought their old workers with them as the skills simply didn’t exist in the state.

               After Graham was the one-term governor Bob Martinez, whose term from 1987 to 1991 was not very good. It all failed for the first Republican to run the state in 20 years due to an extremely unpopular service tax that was later repealed by the same government. He lost election in 1990 to the Senator Lawton Chiles, who would govern the state from 1991 to 1999. However, Republicans added two seats in the state House and three in the state Senate, slowly climbing up to parity with the Democrats. The Republicans also cleverly formed an alliance with black Democrats when it came time to redistrict the state. Because Democrats did not gerrymander to make more black-controlled seats, Republicans in Florida (and nearly all other Southern states) created odd-shaped districts to give more seats to Republicans and black Democrats at the expense of the Democratic party as a whole. Florida was so extremely gerrymandered that Allan Lichtman, a professor at American University, came within one seat of predicting final election results in Florida. As governor, Chiles outsourced the state’s foster-care system, privatized state prisons, and endorsed a proposal to fund charter schools with state money.

               When Jeb Bush was elected governor in 1998, he was coming in as the strongest Republican governor of Florida ever. They had control of the state legislature and started 1999 with control of a majority of the cabinet, enhancing the power of the governor by reducing the size of the cabinet thanks to a constitutional amendment in 1998. Bush ran the state from 1999 to 2007, expanding school voucher programs, cutting taxes, and reducing the size of government. He was replaced by Republican Charlie Crist, who had no agenda to speak of and was a generally weak leader. He, in turn, was replaced by Republican Rick Scott, who the book hardly covers as it was published just 2 years into his term. It is clear, however, that by 2012, Republicans were in firm control of the state, and as I write this in 2019, Republicans hold the legislature, both Senators, and the Governor. The only major Democratic victories would come in the presidential election of Barack Obama and his reelection in 2008 and 2012, when he used his own grassroots network rather than the weak and decayed Florida Democratic Party.

Conclusion

               The history of modern Florida politics seems to center on the struggle of black citizens to win their liberty and equality from the whites (despite the author arguing that Florida was less racist than other Southern states he spends half the book talking about it), the massive population growth that it experienced, the large population of senior citizens, and the arrival of huge groups of immigrants, mainly from other parts of the Americas. This book is an excellent narrative of these events, though it is a top-down look at things from the governor’s perspective. I highly recommend to anyone wanting to learn about elections and important policies in Florida in the modern era. Thank you to my sister Hannah for recommending it to me.

Miscellaneous Facts:

• Florida’s population increased ten times in just one lifetime from 1.9 million people in 1940 to 18.8 million in 2010.
• Florida in the 1950’s was one of the worst apportioned states in the nation, “with only 13.6 percent of the population electing more than half of the state senators and 18 percent choosing more than half of the members of the House of Representatives.”
• The Florida Legislature only met every other year until 1970.
• Florida holds its gubernatorial elections in non-Presidential election years because Democrats worried that the national party was hurting their state party on civil rights issues.
• The political scientist V.O. Key Jr. wrote in 1949 that Florida had the most chaotic political system in the South and therefore the nation, due to being a solely Democratic state that encouraged anyone and everyone to join in political primaries, attracting many scammers, criminals, radicals, and men who weren’t even known in their own hometown.

Reflection on “Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?” by Beverly Daniel Tatum, Ph.D.

               This was a really great book that I finished for that reason (and also because it’s just over 200 pages). Beverly Daniel Tatum is children’s psychologist with a specialty in the development of racial identity. She discusses a lot of things in this book that White people tend not to talk about and has a really effective way of writing that turns the theoretical ideas she talks about into real situations. She teaches classes on racism and uses conversations from those classes in her book; I think the main idea of the book is that in America we nee to have more genuine conversations about race both among and within different racial groups. The book and everything I’ll say below only applies to the United States of America.

               She discusses how white children and adults often think of being White as normal and being anything else as not normal, when, in reality, there are more people in the world who are not “White” than those who are. She discusses how many parents are proud of having “colorblind” children, when really their children were probably seeing and noticing differences in race at three-year-old, but also noticing that no one liked to talk about it, following the same unwritten, unspoken rule themselves. She talks about her own son, asking as a child why, if Black people come from Africa, are they in the United States? She tries to point out better ways to have these conversations with children, and then later in the book, with adults. She talks about how within African American families, people often talk about White features as being better, such as lighter skin and straighter hair.

               She also covers why Black kids may tend to sit with each other during lunch. It has to do with a stage in youth development during puberty, when children start to ask, “Who am I?” and they form their own identities. While White children rarely think about this in racial terms, Black kids are forced to by the society around them. It is usually around adolescence that interracial friendships are strained or end when Black kids need the support of other Black teenagers as they experience racism. Tatum writes, “We need to understand that in racially mixed settings, racial grouping is a developmental process in response to an environmental stressor, racism. Joining with one’s peers for support in the face of stress is a positive coping strategy. On the White side, many parents have fears of interracial dating, and discourage their children from doing so. White teens may not be welcome at a “Black table” because it stifles the ability of Black teenagers to talk freely about what they feel.

               Tatum also discusses the phenomenon of “acting white,” or “talking white,” which many Black children can be accused of if they were raised around White people and adopted certain speech patterns, or just did well in school. Tatum writes, “Historically, the oppositional identity found among African Americans in the segregated South included a positive attitude toward education. While Black people may have publicly deferred to Whites, they actively encouraged their children to pursue education as a ticket to greater freedom. While black parents still see education as the key to upward mobility, in today’s desegregated schools the models of success—the teachers, administrators, and curricular heroes—are almost always White.” I think this really shows the importance of recruiting Black teachers in schools, especially those with high Black student populations. It would also be very good for White students to get a different idea od Black people than how they are informed by stereotypes and the media.

               To end, this was an excellent book and really good reading for me as a White person. I would recommend it to anyone who’s genuinely interested in learning how racism affects all of us on a psychological level and wants to learn about ways to change it. I think this book really gets to the core of these issues in an accessible way and it’s a very good read, remaining relevant even today, about 20 years after it was published.

Reflection on Napoleon: A Life by Andrew Roberts

               I’m not sure what compelled me to read this book at first. I think I just wanted to know what kind of guy Napoleon was since there’s so much controversy over his legacy. I felt like it was dry and tough to get through at points. There was way too much military history for me about battles’ tactics that really don’t seem to matter. I just do not care about Ney’s movements at Waterloo and how Napoleon won Marengo. However, the book was good at getting at Napoleon’s personal life and his politics. I think being him would have been exhausting. He spent almost the entirety of his reign over France at war with one power or another and lost in the end, so that’s not a great legacy. And why did he do it all? Pure self-aggrandizement. There was no plan for changing the world, he just wanted to rule it. He reminds me of a more military minded Littlefinger from Game of Thrones. I don’t understand why someone feels the need to be so important that they would literally kill thousands to get there but maybe that’s because I’m not Napoleon.

Why is Napoleon important?

               Napoleon shaped the world we live in today by conquering continental Europe and spreading many of the values of the French Revolution to states that were already and continued to be very influential. He conquered the most influential countries in the most powerful continent of the 19^th century. Some of the effects he had included the independence of nearly all of Spain’s colonies such as Mexico, Peru, Argentina, and Colombia due to the fact that he conquered Spain and deposed the monarchy. He also destroyed the Holy Roman Empire and united much of Germany, setting the stage for the eventual coalescing of Germany into one single state. However these accomplishments are more incidental than some others, and I’ll explain some of the big results of his life on the military, the economy, and politics.

               Napoleon’s greatest military innovation was the corps system. The corps is a group of tens of thousands of soldiers, bigger than a division but smaller than an army, that Napoleon made completely self-sufficient with infantry, cavalry, and artillery. He would conquer large swathes of Europe by fanning out his corps, and then, at the perfect moment (which is easier said than done), he would collapse them back into a single army to penetrate a weak spot in the enemy’s lines. Napoleon often left tactics to his marshals, but he was a genius when it came to bigger, operational movements. His corps system made him much more agile than his opponents, and once they realized this, the states of Europe adopted the system themselves by 1812 and would use it until 1945.

               Napoleon’s downfall was primarily economic. The author writes that, “At the end of his reign, France has reached only the level of industrialization that Britain had enjoyed in 1780, an indictment of revolutionary, Directory and Napoleonic economic policy and the Colbertism they all followed.” While Napoleon conquered Europe, Great Britain held him in a sea blockade, forcing him to trade through the continent. He attempted to form the “Continental System” to send a blockade right back to Britain, but it hurt his allies and supporters, weakening him further. It made alliance with Russia impossible, leading to his failed invasion and it hurt the French middle-class, who had been his biggest supporters. France also saw its customs revenues drop 80% from 1806-1809 and during the Napoleonic era, British currency depreciated, making exports even cheaper to the continent. Economically, the Napoleonic years in France put the nail in the coffin for a global French empire, as France lost Haiti and sold the Louisiana Purchase while getting boxed in by a stronger and faster growing British economy. France fell far behind.

               Politically, Napoleon spread the ideals of the French Revolution to the rest of Europe, establishing constitutions in the places he conquered and promoting meritocracies that eliminated the old feudal ways in much of Northern Italy, Germany, Poland, and other parts of Europe where his armies went. Ironically, he was probably most responsible for ending much of the liberalism of the French Revolution, as he reintroduced the Church, much of the nobility, and hated taxes from the days of Louis XVI. The most egregious is that he made himself emperor and started marrying off his family members to the houses of Europe. While he partially reconstituted the old monarchy, I feel like Napoleon is a sort of proto-fascist in the way that he micromanaged and had total, personal control over the government, in the way that his support came mainly from middle-class managers and store owners who he protected with tariffs, and in the way that his success was largely based on the military and social conservatism in many ways with large amounts of censorship. He set the stage for future authoritarianism based on the cult of personality. I should also mention that his Napoleonic code is the basis of the modern French law system and forms a component of the law systems of many other European countries.

What was Napoleon like on a personal level?

               From the very beginning, he was extremely ambitious. It helped to be born into a wealthy and somewhat influential Corsican family. He never worked for anyone but himself. During the revolution he pretended to be sick to avoid anything he didn’t want to do and finally made himself useful as a captain of artillery in the south of France and as a crusher of revolt in Paris. He read a lot about Alexander and Caesar and dreamt of putting his name in the history books like them as great conquerors. I wish that Napoleon had had better role models. His ambition was really strong and it’s a shame he wasn’t born in a time where his role model could have been Martin Luther King Jr. or Gandhi. The only ideal he ever believed in besides himself as a young person was Corsican nationalism, resenting that the French had control of his island.

               Napoleon also liked to joke around and developed good rapport with his troops. He kind of seems like the anti-George Washington in many ways. While Washington was serious and even dour, Napoleon was lighthearted and loved jokes. While Washington was understated, Napoleon was a megalomaniac. While Washington gave up power and didn’t enjoy having it, it was like breathing for Napoleon- he absolutely needed it to live.

               He was extremely sexist and never saw women as even close to equals. He frequently made comments referring to women as only good for breeding and he never really fell in love, admitting at the end of his life in exile at St. Helena that he had only ever felt love for his first wife Josephine, but just a little. He frequently paired off his family members to royal houses and viewed marriage through a political lens, eventually divorcing his wife Josephine for the young princess of Austria. He had a weak spot for his family; even though he was very meritocratic in all things, he made an exception to marry his sisters to princes and to make his brothers kings of European states.

               He had a style of conversation that was very direct with people. He would ask questions rapid-fire and try to learn all he could about a subject. He was not afraid of admitting ignorance and many commented that he was unafraid to ask questions that showed that he was completely uninformed, likely because he was sure that he could learn it quickly; he would consistently be right about that. This reminds me a lot of Bill Belichick, who prefers to let the other person do the talking so that he can soak up all the knowledge possible. Napoleon was also a micromanager, constantly sending letters to manage the empire that depended on his person alone. He would go so far as to judge disputes between stagecoach drivers in Italy or theater performers in France while he was campaigning in Germany, Russia, or Poland.

Conclusion

               I would say that France’s and Napoleon’s biggest mistake was invading Europe and not Asia or Africa. While Britain built a strong navy that would last another hundred years as the dominant military force and keep Great Britain as the dominant country, France tried to take over Europe, and failed despite initial successes. Europe was just too strong at the time for any one country to dominate the continent so easily. Even today, such a task would be incredibly difficult. This book was somewhat interesting, but Napoleon’s life was more or less what I expected. An ambitious megalomaniac tries to take over the world and nearly does it, twice. It’s really just a good story about an absolutely crazy guy that would make a very good miniseries filled with drama and betrayal. His story features the highest ecstasy and the lowest most depressing pain at different points, ending with the slow boredom of his last years on St. Helena, where he wrote his memoirs and discussed all the things he did right and wrong with the visitors he received on that remote island. It was an interesting life.

Miscellaneous Facts:

• Napoleon’s record in battle was 53-7, putting him up there in contention for one of the best ever.
• When Napoleon’s sea invasion of Britain was defeated at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, his censorship was so complete that the French didn’t hear about the disaster until 1814.
• Napoleon cooperated with Spain’s Prime Minister Don Manuel de Godoy y Alvarez to invade the country. This guy was some character. Godoy had both his wife and mistress living in the same house, but was also a lover of the queen, and the king was so compliant that when Godoy intercepted a letter warning the king of his cuckolding, he simply passed it on.
• When King Ferdinand of Spain was in captivity, held by Napoleon, he had Stockholm Syndrome and write to Napoleon to congratulate him about a French victory over Spanish forces and then tried to solicit a royal marriage.
• Napoleon’s invasion of Russia was multi-national, involving Poles, Germans, Muslims, and other groups, with French as the largest group, but not a majority.
• Lionel de Rothschild had to be elected three times to the House of Commons before he could take his seat for the constituency of the City of London as the first practicing Jewish MP in 1858.
• The Battle of Borodino was the bloodiest single day in the history of warfare until the first battle of the Marne over a century later.
• Napoleon crossed a river in his Russian retreat at a town called “Studzianka,” which means “very very cold” in Byelorussian.
• Napoleon almost always lied about his battles, exaggerating his victories and downplaying his defeats.

Reflexionando sobre La Historia de Colombia y Sus Oligarquías por Antonio Caballero

              Este libro es una mirada a la historia de los líderes políticos de Colombia han controlado la historia de este país. Generalmente, la tesis de Caballero es que ellos son malos. Han maltratado el país, y aunque podían haber hecho un país próspero y sano, han decidido, generalmente, usar sus poderes para enriquecerse, dejando el resto de la gente defenderse sola. Este libro es el primero que terminé sobre la historia de Colombia y me mantuvo la atención con escritura interesante y cautivado y tiene dibujos, aunque es un libro serio. Sugiero este libro a cualquiera persona interesada en la historia entera de Colombia, especialmente los colombianos que conozco. Voy a tratar de sumar lo que he aprendido del libro en varias preguntas y respuestas a bajo. De pronto me equivoco, pero por eso sigo leyendo.

¿Cuáles son las raíces de la desigualdad en Colombia?

               La desigualdad de Colombia empieza con el terrateniente más grande de España en los siglos XV y XVI, la Iglesia Católica. Un quinto de la población estaba compuesto de sacerdotes, frailes, monjes y los demás. Esta tendencia permanecía en el mundo nuevo, donde los españoles fundaron pueblos y ciudades siempre rodeando una iglesia católica, una plaza, y la alcaldía. Un espacio para Dios, la gente y el gobierno. Resulta que la tierra en el centro de una ciudad vale más, y aumenta el valor cada año. No obstante, otros que llegaron empezaban a comprar y ganar tierras.

               Muy temprano en la conquista, toda la tierra de los indígenas tenía dueño español y todo el oro de sus tumbas ya se había robado. Llegando al siglo XVII, muchísimos españoles pobres zarpaban a América para hacerse ricos y encontraron solo dos maneras de hacerse ricos: casarse con una hija o viuda de un rico, o ganar un oficio de cargo público, “para tener acceso a la teta de la corrupción”. Esto fue seguramente evitable- si el imperio español había guardado tierras para los que podían sembrar y cosechar, hubiera mucho mas trabajo y oportunidad- sin embargo, los reyes de España solo dejaron las dos opciones de maridaje y corrupción. Por eso, la corrupción era una parte integral de la fundación de colonias españolas y de los futuros países latinoamericanos por culpa de la monarquía de España.   

               La conquista se hizo más fácil con la ayuda de enfermedades que mataron hasta tres cuartos de la población indígena. En Colombia, quedaban varias tribus de indígenas, pero más que todo, mezclaban con los españoles para formar gente mestiza. La mayoría de los indígenas desplazados fueron forzados a resguardos, donde trabajaban forzado, aunque asalariado en la ganadería o las minas para beneficio de propietarios españoles. Porque la población se estratificaba muy temprano, resultó que los españoles y criollos quienes se pensaban mejores de otros por color de su piel no sentían la necesidad de proveer para los demás negros, indios y mestizos. Entonces toda la riqueza del país pasaba a las manos de los blancos y ellos nunca pensaban en dejar alguien no blanco, la mayoría de la población, ganar mucho dinero.

¿Por qué se independizó Colombia y cuáles eran los rasgos más importantes de la independencia?

               Colombia, como los otros países sudamericanos, no se independizó como Estados Unidos, decidiendo acabar con el reino de lejos. Sin embargo, se independizaron como resultado de la invasión de España por Napoleón, derrocando el rey de España y su imperio. Durante el periodo de la “Patria Boba”, las colonias españolas autogobernaban, y rápidamente se dieron cuenta de que los españoles no eran necesarios para la gobernación de américa. Los americanos la podían hacer muy bien. Antes de Napoleón, había indicaciones que no todos estaban contentos en Nueva Granada. En 1781, reaccionando a un aumento del impuesto de alcabala, la subida de precios de sal, tabaco y aguardiente y un tributo adicional, se levantó Socorro, un pueblo en el interior del país, cerca de Bogotá en una rebelión llamada la rebelión de los Comuneros. Fue exitoso, y tras tres meses el gobierno cedió todo, bajando impuestos y otorgando un indulto general para los participantes.

               Colombia fue a desorden inicialmente, porque los políticos no eran unidos para luchar contra España, sino luchaban entre sí. El autor dice que fue “Cartagena contra Mompox, Quibdó contra Nóvita, El Socorro contra Tunja.” Casi ganaron la independencia (aunque seguían peleando las distintas ciudades) cuando España finalmente quito Napoleón y envió fuerzas para reconquistar América. A Cartagena llegó Pablo Morillo, “El pacificador”, pero fuel eventualmente expulsado a un costo humano muy grande.

Colombia ganó su independencia, pero de manera caótica sin establecer un líder o una organización para gobernarse. En entender porque Colombia no salió como Estados Unidos, hay que saber que Colombia no tuvo un general supremo como George Washington, sino que todos las regiones pelearon entre sí. También estableció Bolívar una constitución que no funcionaba y fue negada en pocos años. En adición, como resultado de explotación española y la falta de infraestructura de transporte, no había un sentido de “la nación”. La rivalidad entre generales Páez y Santander resultó en la partición de Venezuela y Colombia y en pocos años el proyecto del “Gran Colombia” se terminó. Las guerras de independencia en Latinoamérica eran muy sangrientas y en Colombia se disminuyó la población bastante, muchos más que la Revolución de Estados Unidos.

¿Cómo cambió Colombia entre la independencia y La Guerra de los Mil Días?

               Colombia, fracasando en solidificar los resultados de una revolución “limpio”, pasó por el siglo XIX en una inestabilidad profunda. Pasaron más que 30 presidentes de Colombia en los ochenta años entre la independencia en 1819 y 1899, cuando comenzó la guerra. También había 48 guerras civiles. Sí, 48—cuarenta locales y ocho nacionales, pero siempre ganaba el gobierno nacional debido al mismo motivo porque rebelaba tanto la gente—la falta de cohesión del país. Como el país no pudo mantenerse completo, tampoco los rebeldes podían hacer lo mismo. Esta inestabilidad atrasó al país muy gravemente en su infancia.

               Colombia desarrolló dos partidos políticos en el siglo XIX que duran hasta hoy, los liberales y los conservadores en 1848 y 1849 respectivamente. Nacieron en los periódicos, como casi todos los políticos de esa época eran periodistas y militares también, luchando en batalla y en las noticias. Los liberales ganaron la guerra civil de 1859-62 y ratificaron una constitución nueva en 1863. Expropiaron las tierras de la iglesia católica con el fin de devolverlas a la gente, pero terminaron en venderlas a los más ricos del país, más aumentando la desigualdad y favoreciendo sus aliados políticos. La Constitución de Rionegro, como se llamaba, redujo el poder del estado central y separó la iglesia del estado. Sin embargo, por falta de su poder gubernamental, el gobierno liberal no pudo planear proyectos que querían, como la construcción de una férrea que conectara todo el país, y Colombia atrasaba más sin proyectos públicos de infraestructura. Se puede decir que los estados de Colombia eran fuertes pero la nación de Colombia muy débil. El fracaso de esta constitución resultara en una nueva guerra civil veinte años después.

               Los liberales mantenían poder de 1862-3 hasta la guerra civil de 1885, cuando cayó el sistema desordenado y caótico del federalismo y comenzó medio siglo de hegemonía conservadora. La guerra terminó con la figura de Rafael Nuñez como presidente de la República, y él, conocido como liberal, se convirtió a conservador. Cuando redactaron la nueva constitución de 1886, solo se dejaba redactar dos delegados de cada región, uno conservador y otro “nacionalista”, es decir, alguien del partido liberal pero muy moderado, antirradical y nuñista. La nueva constitución era cuasi teocrática, muy centralista y casi dictatorial de muchas maneras en los poderes que otorgó al presidente. Por ejemplo, dio control de educación a la iglesia católica, determinando textos escolares y universitarios y también los docentes. Pero al menos arregló al sistema en que los ejércitos de los estados eran más poderosos que el del gobierno nacional. Resultó que esta constitución centralista, más parecido a la que había escrito Bolívar, duraría. También se fundó el primer compromiso de los grandes partidos políticos de Colombia. La gran parte del Partido Conservador y bastante moderados del Partido Liberal juntaron para formar el Partido Nacional, que dirigiera la “Regeneración Nacional”. Los que quedaron, los liberales radicales y los conservadores “históricos”, no tendrían nada de poder. Eventualmente, los Conservadores volverían, haciendo un golpe de estado en medio de La Guerra de los Mil Días. Mientras que su forma de gobierno sólo duró una década y media, la constitución que promulgó duro un siglo entero, hasta 1991.

               El siglo XIX terminó con la guerra civil más sangrienta y larga de la historia de Colombia, L a Guerra de los Mil Días, muriendo más de cien mil: “más que en todas las guerras del siglo XIX sumadas, para una población total de unos cuatro millones de habitantes”. Los conservadores salieron de la guerra más poderosos que nunca, derrotando el carismático líder liberal, Rafael Uribe Uribe y comenzando el periodo de “hegemonía conservadora” de 1902-1930.

¿Qué era el “Frente Nacional” y como se realizó después de las épocas de hegemonías partidistas?

               La historia de Colombia tiene una simetría interesante. El presidente Rafael Núñez formó una coalición bipartidista para su programa de “Regeneración Nacional” llamada el Partido Nacional. Debido a los fracasos de ese gobierno, había una guerra civil, seguido por una época de hegemonía conservador, terminado cuando los conservadores pelearon entre sí y un liberal ganó la presidencia. La hegemonía liberal pasó y terminó cuando los liberales pelearon entre sí y perdieron la presidencia. Después se luchó una guerra civil, y como antes, perdieron los liberales. Terminó con otro acuerdo bipartidista, la “Frente Nacional”, terminando donde empezamos 70 años antes bajo de Núñez.

               Como los liberales ganaron las elecciones de 1930 por resultado de un disputo entre conservadores, acabando con casi 50 años de hegemonía conservador y casi 30 años con un representante solo en la legislatura, los conservadores ganaron en 1946, acabando con 16 años de hegemonía liberal debido a un disputo entre dos candidatos liberales, Gabriel Turbay del establecimiento del partido, y el populista Jorge Eliecer Gaitán. Ellos partieron el voto liberal y ganó el conservador Mariano Ospina Pérez. Los liberales habían regido inicialmente con “La Revolución en Marcha” de Alfonso López Pumarejo, llevando reformas, pero López cambió de amigos y hizo pausa a las reformas. A este punto llego Gaitán, quien había ganado fama como abogado representando los bananeros sobrevivientes de la Matanza de las Bananeras hecha por la United Fruit Company. Gaitán y Turbay parten el voto liberal y gana Ospina, pero Gaitán se prepara para hacerse candidato de nuevo. Sin embargo, se asesina en abril de 1948, chocando toda la nación. Con este acontecimiento comienza el Bogotazo, días de asonadas en Bogotá que dejaron entre dos y tres mil muertos, también reflejadas en varias ciudades de Colombia.

               La Violencia oficialmente empezó en 1946, pero en 1948 aumentó mucho. Escribe Caballero, “Si en el año 47 había causado catorce mil asesinatos, en el 48 las víctimas mortales llegaron a cuarenta y tres mil, con el correlativo éxodo de varios cientos de miles de personas de unos pueblos…” Los liberales intentaron llevar Ospina a juicio político, pero él contestó por cerrar en Congreso y decretar el estado de sitio.  Purgó la Corte Suprema, el Consejo de Estado y el Tribuno Electoral de magistrados liberales. También expulsó todos los agentes de policía de filiación liberal. Los conservadores, como hacían los dos partidos a menudo, hicieron un fraude para ganar la elección, aunque los liberales decretaron abstención electoral y ganó Laureano Gómez, el conservador y único candidato. El era muy fascista, inspirado por Hitler, Mussolini y Franco. Sus políticas incluían declarar la guerra en Corea con Estados Unidos y la “recristianización de la enseñanza”, acabando con la educación mixta, enseñanza sexual y deportes femeninos. Debido a problemas de salud, tuvo que resignarse y dio poder Roberto Urdaneta, quien fue derrocado por el ejército en un golpe de estado dirigido por Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. Bajo la “Tercera Fuerza”, es decir no liberal ni conservador, del ejército, aumentaba el resentimiento de los antiguos políticos, y gracias a la falta de poder de los dos, decidieron formar un pacto, “La Frente Nacional”.

               Inicialmente con la intención de ser una alianza de 12 años, la Frente Nacional duró, alternando presidentes conservadores y liberales, de 1958 a 1991, los 33 años hasta que se firmó una nueva constitución. 200 mil colombianos habían muertos en La Violencia y el país estuvo listo para un cambio y un compromiso. No obstante, había algunos que decían que no. Eran guerrilleros liberales que no acordaban con compromiso con los conservadores. Se llamaban las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), un grupo de autodefensa campesina apadrinado por el Partido Comunista y dirigido por Manuel Mirulanda “Tirofijo”, el Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), “fundado por estudiantes y curas… inspirados por… la revolución cubana” y el Ejército Popular de Liberación, un grupo Maoísta de Urabá y el Bajo Cauca antioqueño. Colombia nunca ha podido controlar todo su territorio.

¿Cómo desarrollaron la guerrilla y sus opositores?

               Para muchos años, los guerrilleros seguían en las selvas y las montañas de Colombia, incontrolados por el gobierno central. Su único enemigo era el gobierno y su ejército hasta unos eventos críticas. Usando el secuestro como manera de ganar plata, secuestraron eventualmente un hijo de la nueva “clase emergente”, los narcotraficantes. Bajo el liderazgo de Pablo Escobar comenzó el primer grupo paramilitar, Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS). En 1984, alcanzaron una tregua entre el gobierno y el FARC y el Movimiento 19 de abril (M-19), que se nombró por las elecciones fraudulentas del 19 de abril 1970 y que ganó fama por robar la espada de Simón Bolívar. M-19 decidió terminar con la tregua el 6 de noviembre de 1985, atacando al Palacio de Justicia, tomando los magistrados de la Corte Suprema como rehenes. Terminó en incendio y murieron todos los asaltantes y casi todos los magistrados. También murió la única oportunidad de paz que aparecerá para 25 años. Más grupos paramilitares formaron para luchar contra guerrillas, y parece que los dos sembraban y vendían drogas para financiar sus guerras. No voy a escribir más en esto porque llega a la actualidad.

               Durante este conflicto, Colombia logró convocar una Asamblea Constituyente verdaderamente democrática para la primera vez en su historia. Todas las constituciones colombianas habían sido escritas por alianzas excluyentes, un partido que había ganado al otro o un grupo victorioso en una guerra civil. La constitución más larga del mundo con 380 artículos fue redactada por consenso, aunque sólo hubo dos millones de votos en un país de casi 35 millones. El libro no habla mucho de la Constitución de 91 pero me gustaría leer más para aprender que tiene y por qué.

Conclusión

               La historia de Colombia me parece la historia de dos tendencias: el gobierno, tratando de afirmar su control sobre todo su tierra, y el pueblo colombiano, tratando de acabar con la corrupción de sus políticos y gobernadores. Me parece, aunque muchos son pesimistas sobre temas políticas, que Colombia ha progresado bastante en las dos áreas. Hoy, Colombia tiene una constitución escrita democráticamente para primera vez y tiene paz con FARC. La guerrilla que sigue hasta hoy es muy disminuida. Es muy posible que Colombia vuelve atrás, pero creo que si va un paso atrás, pisará la nación dos pasos adelante, paulatinamente llegando a la democracia fuerte que merece la gente.

Datos misceláneos:

• Cuando Cristóbal Colon encontró el ají en América, trató de llamarlo “pimiento” y puede ser que por eso se llaman los dos en inglés “pepper”
• Uno de los primeros conquistadores que llegó a Bogotá, Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada, era descendiente de judeoconversos, pero la sábana de Bogotá se halló por tres conquistadores casi simultáneamente, él, llegando de Santa Marta, Federman, llegando de Coro, Venezuela y Belancázar, llegando de Quito por Popayán. La conquista de Colombia, como otras partes de América, fue un desorden total. Los españoles y los indígenas pelearon entre ellos y entre sí. Y esos tres fueron a Cartagena para demandarse entre sí muy pronto después de llegar a Santa Fe de Bogotá.
• En 1530, un grupo de esclavos marrones incendió la ciudad de Santa Marta.
• Se desarrolló Cartagena debido a que “Las Bocas de Ceniza” no eran navegables para entrar el Río Magdalena. Para resolver el problema, los españoles construyeron el Canal del Dique, conectando por medio de varias ciénagas, el río con el mar. Donde se conectó con el mar se fundó Cartagena.
• El ataque naval del almirante Edward Vernon fue la batalla mas grande desde la batalla de Lepanto, ciento setenta años antes contra los turcos. Tenía 186 buques y 26.000 hombres. Fue la derrota más grande del Royal Navy en su historia y la última victoria grande que tuvo el imperio español.
• En el siglo XVII, Cartagena tenía cinco hasta seis mil habitantes, un tercio españoles y dos tercios esclavos africanos y ningunos indígenas. Cartagena era en esa época el mercado más grande de esclavos de América trayendo más de la mitad en los siglos XVI y XVII, dos mil por mes.
• El primer censo de Nueva Granada fue hecho en 1778, mostrando un poco más de 800.000 habitantes, 200.000 blancos (españoles y criollos), 400.000 mezclados (mestizos, mulatos y zambos), 200.000 indios y 65.000 negros esclavos.
• Colombia sólo reanudó relaciones diplomáticas con España sesenta años después del fin de la guerra de Independencia.
• El primer periódico que duró más de una campaña política en Colombia era El Tiempo, publicado por el una-vez-presidente Eduardo Santos, también tío abuelo del futuro presidente Juan Manuel Santos.
• Las mujeres colombianas ganaron el derecho de sufragio en el año 1957, bajo la Frente Nacional.

Reflection on America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History by Andrew J. Bacevich

               This book puts forward the argument that American military intervention in the Middle East since 1980 has been a failure because it neither stays out of problems, nor commits to them, rather aggravating them with an unsatisfying middle ground. It’s a military history, chronicling every American shot fired in the “Greater Middle East” since the Carter Administration. I thought it was an excellent analysis, as it was basically what I already agreed with in many ways. I wanted to read it because after finishing Ken Burns’ Vietnam War documentary I wanted to learn more about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

How did the United States become to deeply involved in Middle Eastern conflict?

               It begins with United States Central Command, or CENTCOM, which was founded in 1983, with an Area of Responsibility (AOR) of 19 countries, meant by the Pentagon to respond to specific crises. However, the organization would soon find itself drawn in to a great number of specific crises, many of which were over quickly, but would have great diplomatic ramifications. It ties very well into The War on Peace by Ronan Farrow, in that both discuss how diplomacy became subordinate to the military. While this is a familiar situation in Israel, it was new in the United States and hasn’t gone so well.

               CENTCOM intervened in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia before invading Afghanistan in 2001 and all of these military actions served to draw us into more action. This happened firstly because it created friends and enemies who wanted us to defend them or wanted to attack us, and secondly because in each of these places, the presence of American soldiers attracted foreign fighters to attach them. Why would foreigners get involved? Because these are all Muslim countries, and radical Islamists see them all as part of the greater Muslim community, just as Muslims from Indonesia, Belgium, Egypt, and other countries today go to fight in Syria. Ricardo Sanchez, who was the head of American forces in Iraq for about a year, called the invasion a “terrorist magnet,” though he meant it as a good thing, saying he wanted to fight them there. It was during his tenure that Al-Qaeda in Iraq would be established in October 2004. It was unable to do so earlier, but thanks to US invasion it could. It was this organization that would evolve to form ISIS.

So what’s the deal with Afghanistan and Iraq?

The last Soviet troops leave Afghanistan in 1989 and the regime they installed lasted surprisingly long, until 1992. After it’s fall, a civil war ensued until 1996, when the Taliban gained control of the country for five years and Osama bin Laden returned. He then planned the 9/11 attack on the United States and the United States invaded in 2001, continuing with a force in the country to this day. The Bush administration saw that it was strategically a dead end to fight the Taliban, as Afghanistan had nothing for us, yet they remained, and the Obama administration actually increased focus on the Taliban, which the author felt was a mistake. I liked this analogy he used: “The war against the Taliban became an exercise in strategic irrelevance—as if in response to Southern secession, Abraham Lincoln had sent the Union Army to Brazil to liberate the black multitudes held in bondage there.”

 In 1980, Iraq invaded Iran hoping to gain control of oil field in southwestern Iran. Seeking an opportunity to disrupt the new Islamic Republic, the United States bolstered Iraq, managing to keep Iraq from being overrun, ending the war in a stalemate in 1988. In 1990, overconfident, Saddam invaded Kuwait when its ruling family refused to forgive his debts to them and was rebuffed by the United States, easily defeated, though not toppled. This was because George HW Bush wanted to leave the regime intact to counter Iran. In 2003, the United States chose to finish the job, crushing Hussein and eventually killing him, though the peace was harder to win than the war. In 2006, sectarian violence erupted between Sunnis and Shiites, complicating the American occupation, as the USA lost all initiative and the war went on with US forces trapped in the middle. The United States managed to withdraw by 2011, pretending it was a victory, but had to return by 2014 when ISIS, originally a part of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, broke off to form its own Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria.

What is the American strategy in the Middle East?

               Bacevich writes that it begins with the Carter administration seeking to secure free passage of oil in the Arabian Gulf so that the United States’ supply is never threatened. However, by the time of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it had changed. By that point, he writes that Bush was seeking to prove the “efficacy of preventative war,” the legitimacy of the United States to remove regimes that it did not like, and to impose American-style liberalism on the Iraqi people. The greater Middle East strategy since the Bush administration has been to shape the entire region using American military strength to try to convert these countries into our social, economic, and most of all military allies.

Why has American strategy in the Middle East been a failure?

               The author writes that it comes from the compromising urge to take the middle ground. For example, consider that when beginning the War on Terror, unlike the Civil War, World War II, or the Cold War, President Bush 43 asked for no sacrificed from the American people. He did not ask for a draft, higher taxes, or any rationing. Instead people maintained their lives as normal. This was hubris talking. When it was not possible for the USA to win the war with the scant resources civilian leadership provided, there would be no more resources coming because the urgent threat was by the point of realization to far in the past. Then it becomes the worst of both worlds, because, as Bacevich puts it, “Wherever the American army shows up, it tends to stay a while,” meaning that not only would the USA not win the war, but that it would stay there, stuck in a stalemate, hemorrhaging blood and dollars.

               I agree with this sentiment with one addition: the focus on the army is flawed and should be more focused on the navy. In general, the United States should spend far more money and effort on building up a stronger navy and use it to blockade countries that choose to be our enemy. Our land forces are not good in enemy territory, especially not for a long time. In places where they are without significant naval support, they cannot succeed, and that makes it nearly impossible to win wars in countries that are poor and have few roads to connect our soldiers to the sea. The ocean is the American military’s lifeline and we neglected it far too much in Iraq and Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a perfect example, where supplies have to enter Karachi by sea and travel hundreds of miles inland. Sea power is America’s past, present, and future. When we neglect it, we fail.

Conclusion

               Bacevich writes that before 9/11 our great problem in the Middle East was ignorance. After 9/11 it was hubris. Since the Obama administration it has been diffusion. I would add that in the Trump presidency we have brought back the hubris to add to the diffusion with inconsistency as well. We just withdrew from Syria, a move that I hope will turn out well for us because we really need out of these conflicts. This is a five-star book for anybody who studied international affairs or the Middle East and wants to learn more. Extremely good, if critical military history.

Miscellaneous thoughts/facts/reflections on the book:

• While American forces in Operation Desert Storm were approximately 560,000, equaling the total strength of American forces at the height of the Vietnam War, forces were only 170,000 when the United States invaded again in 2003.
• While NATO is “nominally a partnership of equals” the United States actually occupies a special position as the leader.
• George W. Bush never convened a meeting to ask his advisers about the idea of invading Iraq and there was never a paper discussing pros and cons passed around the White House. There was no decision-making process so much as a consensus that it was the next step after Afghanistan.
• Pakistan proved to be a very bad ally in the Second Afghanistan War (our invasion from 2001 onward, not the earlier Soviet invasion) for two reasons. First, they knew the USA would eventually leave, and they wanted the Taliban as an ally, and second, because they were already busy with the Indian border. Fighting Islamist terrorism was not out Pakistani ally’s priority.
• Why don’t American tactics work in the Middle East? Because it’s good to meet your enemy at their level of combat and beat them at their own game, and we refuse to play any game but our own.