Reflection on How to Defend Australia by Hugh White

               This was a kind of weird book to pick up being that I am not Australian and know very little about Australia but as someone interested in how future conflict in the Western Pacific will look I found Hugh White’s case for Australia to remain a medium power to be fascinating. White points out that America has disengaged from the region due to the War on Terror. Even as the USA returns with the “pivot to Asia,” American power will not be undisputed in the region again in our lifetime. The rise of China, soon to be followed by a likely rise of India, traps Australia between a rock and a hard place (not to mention an ascendant Indonesia). White argues for a reorientation of Australian defense policy to its immediate region and to the important goal of the independent defense of Australia, assuming no outside help.

               White often returns to a critical event in recent Australian military history, the 2000 white paper released by the Howard government, which reoriented Australian military policy to focus less on defending the homeland and more on foreign intervention and assisting US forces in a hypothetical war against China. White argues that this is not in Australia’s interest. Now that both China and Indonesia are far stronger than they were 20 years ago, White points out that Australia cannot focus so much on projecting force far from its borders. With US capabilities in decline in the Western Pacific, Australia must focus on its own self-defense.

               One of White’s most interesting points is that, “History may well judge that the most important long-term consequence of 9/11 was the way the attacks that day distracted American from the biggest strategic shift of our time. They stopped America recognizing China’s rise, made it easier for China to challenge US leadership, and harder for America to remain a significant power in Asia.” He points out that both US and Australian forces began to tailor their capabilities to needs in Iraq and Afghanistan and failed to develop capabilities that are necessary in the Western Pacific. Now, White says, Australia lacks sufficient submarines yet has a huge and useless investment in amphibious land forces and a large surface fleet to protect them. Australian combat aircraft cannot sustain operations without massive US support. Now Australia will survive a major regional war only at the pleasure of the United States.

               The author points out four “permanent strategic interests” of Australia; they are based on Lord Palmerston’s model that required England to oppose the strongest power on continental Europe. Each interest represents an area of importance to Australia’s defense. In declining order of importance, they are:

• The military balance in the waters and airspace immediately surrounding Australia, and especially the area between continental Australia and the archipelago to the north
• The closest islands of the archipelago to the north that can be used to launch attacks against Australia
• The huge archipelago of maritime Southeast Asia including Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines
• The final ring includes Japan, India, and China and the balance of relations between those countries

This makes it seem kind of ridiculous that Australia participated in the War on Terror. While at the time it must have looked important to maintain good relations with the USA, today Australia’s situation is very different. To look that the geography of where Australia lies, it is clear that its interests lie far closer to home than Iraq or Afghanistan. As a goal, White says that Australia should strive to be able to defend itself from a major Asian power.

               One of the most important things for Australia to achieve is sea denial in its immediate area rather than sea control. While Australia has invested in major surface warships in the past that enable sea control, the ability to move one’s own ships across a stretch of ocean, it would be better for Australia to focus on sea denial, the ability to stop an enemy from moving across an important stretch of ocean. To attack, you need control and to defend you need denial. Since White wants to defend Australia, he focuses on denial. Thanks to technological changes in missiles and air power, most surface ships are just targets, incapable of defending themselves. For that reason, White suggest a dramatic increase in Australia’s submarine fleet paired with a reduction in its number of surface ships. White argues that, “warships will remain valuable for operations in waters that are not contested by other maritime powers, and likewise carriers and amphibious ships will remain useful in uncontested waters against less capable adversaries. But their roles in major maritime conflicts will disappear. Instead, war at sea will be dominated by submarines, aircraft, drones, missiles and satellites.” I found myself very convinced by his thinking. To bring this back to what Australia needs, White says that air and sea forces must be able to deny approaches to Australia and land forces must be able to challenge any landing on Australian shores. As for land forces, White recommends taking a page from the Russians and using the size of their continent-country to their advantage in maneuver warfare.

               In summation, Australia needs to change its military orientation now. Australia continues to develop naval forces for sea control and power projection that would support the US Navy; and while this is great for America, it does Australia no good in defending itself. Australia’s offensive-minded forces should become more defensive. For me, it will be interesting to see if this happens, though as an American I feel like I should hope for the opposite of what White wants. It seems like it would be better to have an Australian ally geared to help us out in the West Pacific rather than just defend itself.

Miscellaneous Facts:

• Thanks to technological advances, air-to-air combat will likely not involve much dogfighting in the future. In the modern day, aircraft can launch long-range missiles outside of sight range and accurately hit other planes, meaning that “who wins a clash between fighters will depend on which side launches its missile and gets it within the other’s no-escape zone first.”