Friday, April 26, 2024

The Guns of August by Barbara W. Tuchman

     The Guns of August was a fantastic book. Tuchman does an amazing job of laying out the dramatic first month of World War One, starting with the invasion of Belgium and the Battle of the Frontiers and ending with the First Battle of the Marne, leaving the Race to the Sea and the rest of the war in epilogue, as a sort of anticlimax. This is a great book because it seamlessly travels from the generals in their headquarters to the politicians and diplomats in the European capitals, and then to the troops on the ground. There are diversions to the Eastern Front, but this book is mainly about the Western Front. Tuchman is a real master of her craft. My only complaint is that reading the details about all the generals can get a little tedious, but I think that is just because I'm not as interested. That's what Tuchman wanted to write about, and she did so very successfully.

    Early in the book, Tuchman explains in detail the significance of Belgium, which she writes was a creation of England as a neutral and independent country. It was on those plains that became Belgium that Wellington defeated Napoleon, and then England was determined, as the predominant power in the world, to create a neutral zone there that would prevent its use as a launching point for cross-channel invasions. But the original plan was to attach Belgium to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Catholic Belgians resisted this in a revolt in 1830, succeeding in becoming independent, recognized as such in Europe in 1839.

    The Germans and the French had sharply contrasting plans, but with one similar goal. Each country wanted to swing hard with their right hook, concentrating forces on a flank. For the French, this was to cross the Rhine at Mainz, northwest of Nancy, on the actual Franco-German border. This was known as Plan 17. The Germans, through the Schlieffen Plan, were determined to violate Belgium's neutrality and take the French at an area on the French left that would be less defended, although a longer route for the Germans. The French plan was very flexible, but maybe not in a good way. It contained no overall objective and no explicit timetables. Its intention was to attack, remain on the attack, and get back on the attack if temporarily pushed back. The German plan was much more rigid. It required hitting France hard and fast to eliminate France as a threat on their Western Front before Russia could mobilize in the east.

    The war was triggered by the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, on June 28, 1914. The Serbian nationalists who killed him wanted Austria out of Serbia. The result was an Austrian occupation of Serbia, and a German pledge on July 5 to give Austria its "faithful support." Austria delivered an ultimatum to Serbia on July 23, and then rejected the Serbian reply on July 26 (even though Serbia met almost all Austrian demands) and declared war on Serbia on July 28. On July 29, Austria began bombarding Belgrade, and the Russians began mobilizing on their Austrian border to defend Serbia on July 30. On July 31, Germany issued an ultimatum to Russia to demobilize within twelve hours. At the same time, Germany made the same ultimatum to France, also demanding surrender of French forts at Toul and Verdun, a ridiculous proposition. Many have criticized this since Germany should have just induced France to remain neutral, but it seems clear that Germany had no trust in France to do that, as France would have much to gain by attacking Germany while its forces were in the east. When Germany went to war with France, Britain joined France as an ally, seeing Germany as the bigger threat. Most thought the war would be quick and decisive, with few, like Lord Kitchener, predicting a multi-year war ("We must be prepared to put armies of millions in the field and maintain them for several years.").

    Admiral Wilhelm Souchon was commanding the German fleet in the Mediterranean at 6pm on August 3 when he learned war was declared. He commanded the Goeben and the Breslau and immediately set sail for the Western Mediterranean to try to escape from the Adriatic Sea. Initially, he sought to intercept three French ships on their way south to Algeria, and continued despite receiving an order from Admiral Tirpitz to turn around and make for Constantinople. He steamed ahead at full speed until he saw the Algerian coast, where he ran up a Russian flag and opened fire. According the Kriegsbrauch, the manual issued by German General Staff, "The putting on of enemy uniforms and the use of enemy or neutral flags or insignia with the aim of deception are declared permissible," even though this was directly contrary to the German-signed Hague convention. After that shelling of at least one French ship and the city of Philippeville, Souchon turned back to Messina in Sicily to coal there from German steamers before setting coarse for Constantinople 1,200 miles away. Below is the route taken.

By MartinD - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3683178

On the morning of August 4, the British ships Indomitable and Indefatigable encountered the Goeben and Breslau heading east back to Messina. But because of the timing of the ultimatums going back and forth, Britain and Germany weren't yet at war. If the British ultimatum was sent to Germany one night before, they would have been at war. But instead, the ships passed within 8,000 yards of each other in silence. See below.

By Bundesarchiv, Bild 134-C2320 / CC-BY-SA 3.0, CC BY-SA 3.0 de, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=5337867

    Souchon made it to Messina where two messages reached him. One told him to actually not go to Constantinople, due to divided counsel in the Ottoman capital. Passage of the German ships would violate Turkish neutrality. The second informed Souchon that the Austrians could give him no naval help in the Mediterranean, and that Souchon was essentially on his own. Knowing he didn't have the speed to make a run through Gibraltar, and "rebell[ing] against holing himself up in Pola, dependent on the Austrians," Souchon decided to make for Constantinople anyway, with a political instead of a military goal: to bring the Ottomans into the war. The Germans were surrounded on either side of the Strait of Messina, with the stronger British ships protecting the western side, anticipating a breakout in that direction. But after recoaling, the Germans moved east, chased by a smaller ship, the Gloucester, that wouldn't get in range because the Germans would blow it out of the water. Captain Kelly telegraphed Admiral Milne and Troubridge, and the British ships gave chase. Some shots were exchanged, with no damage taken on either side, and the British ships withdrew, expecting the Germans to turn West, which they never did. At that time, a small Italian ship happened to pass by, which happened to have a two-year-old Barbara Tuchman on it, and she and her family witnessed the action.

    Upon reaching Constantinople, the plan transformed into "selling" the ships to the Ottomans, transforming them into the Jawus and the Midilli, flying the Turkish flag. By the end of October, Souchon, still commanding the now-Ottoman ships, entered the Black Sea and shelled Odessa, Sevastopol, and Feodosia, killing civilians and sinking a Russian gunboat, bringing Russia into the war on November 4.

    On land, Germany entered Belgium first, and on August 4, with German columns marching on Liege, the King of Belgium pleaded for help from France, Britain, or anyone. No one was ready to oppose the Germans in Belgium, as the British wanted to be the last ones in (so they wouldn't lose their entire army immediately), and the French were planning to attack in a totally different direction. The Germans were shocked (although they shouldn't have been) that the British chose to side with the French. The Germans conquered the country by August 15. Although the world celebrated Belgium's heroism at delaying the invader, the Germans had already planned some time to be delayed in Belgium, so the delay was only two days, not two weeks as many thought. In Belgium, the Germans had taken severe measures against civilians, taking leaders hostage (and sometimes killing them), burning towns and cities (including a major library), and killing civilians to punish cities for resisting. The German thinker Clausewitz had prescribed terror as the proper method to shorten war, since it would force the population to submit. But the opposite effect occurred, building resentment and resistance against the German occupation.

    Critically, Germany's commander, Moltke, changed the inflexible Schlieffen plan to make it something it was not. The plan called for total commitment on the right side to sweep through Belgium and hit France. But Moltke was tempted by successes on Germany's left, on the actual French border. Initially, the plan was to make a strategic retreat, to capture the French in a sack in the east. But in the face of real war, the Germans advanced in the east too. It turns out that the French were unprepared on all fronts, even the east, where they planned their attack. It couldn't have helped that they wore red trousers, and it couldn't have helped that French Field Regulations calculated that in 20 seconds the infantry could cover 50 meters before the enemy could fire, but that with machine guns it only took the Germans 8 seconds. By August 23, it was clear that the French had broken against the smaller portion of the German forces in the east and the center, not to mention the massive force coming from the north/west. But the one thing that could be said of the French is that they were learning and started a strategic retreat to catch the Germans in a "sack" of their own. This fooled the Germans into a sense of complacency, although some were attuned enough to ask that, if the French were routed, why have we taken no prisoners? But the German advances already decided that the Germans could not be defeated easily. By taking Belgium and northern France, the Germans were in control of the industrial power of both countries, massive coal fields, iron mines, rivers, railroads, and agriculture. This would feed the German war machine for the rest of the war. Luckily for the French, the Germans were forced to send two corps east. The Russians had mobilized far faster than expected in support of their French allies. But they were also defeated far faster than expected at the Battle of Tannenberg. But in this defeat, the Russians bought the French valuable time.

    In those early days of the war, German war aims included control of the European continent, which would require abolition of neutral states at Germany's borders, the end of England's hegemony in world affairs, and the breaking up of Russia. The nations Germany defeated would have to pay massive reparations for direct war costs, veterans funds, public housing, gifts for generals and statesmen, and all of Germany's national debt.  These aims ironically foreshadowed the reparations that would go in the other direction at the end of the war.

    Meanwhile in the North Sea and Baltic, Germany kept its fleet in a defensive posture. The fleet, which had so threatened Britain enough to create permanent enmity between the two countries and drive Britain into France's arms, was now useless in an actual fight. Instead, the Kaiser wanted to keep the fleet for bargaining purposes after the war, plus, it was still weaker than the British fleet it would need to fight to break out of the North Sea. Britain was therefore able to blockade Germany throughout the war, which helped bring America in on the Allies' side, as US trade with the Central Powers diminished from $169 million in 1914 to $1 million in 1916, while trade with the Allies in the same period rose from $824 million to $3 billion. The German fleet was to remain a "fleet-in-being," as the Germans hoped for an early victory on land that never came.

    In the final days of August, Joffre, who had mismanaged the first weeks of the war, became focused on his counter-attack. Tuchman praises him in this period and writes that

What went on behind that opaque exterior he never showed. If he owed his composure to a failure of imagination, that was fortunate for France. Ordinary men, Clausewitz wrote, become depressed by a sense of danger and responsibility; if these conditions are to "lend wings to strengthen the judgment, there must be present unusual greatness of soul." If danger did not strengthen Joffre's judgment in any way, it did call forth a certain strength of character. When ruin was all around him, he maintained an even tenor, a solid control, what Foch, who saw him on August 29, called a "wonderful calm" which held the French Army together in an hour when it most needed the cement of confidence.

On the eve of battle, he heard the news that the Russians had been crushed at Tannenberg, but with the consolation that the two German corps had been diverted to the east (and had been diverted unnecessarily, as they arrived after the battle). And the French, with Paris blacked out and the government fleeing to Bordeaux, caught a lucky break. Instead of going to Paris, the Germans swung east of the city, presenting their flank to the French army garrisoned in the city. The Germans were flanked at the First Battle of the Marne just outside Paris, and were forced to retreat, both sides racing to the sea to try to (unsuccessfully) outflank the other. The Germans had been exhausted from forced marches on the way to Paris, and many were captured sleeping or unable to take another step in the early September heat. The German general Alexander von Kluck gave the reason for the German failure at the Marne:

The reason that transcends all others was the extraordinary and peculiar aptitude of the French soldier to recover quickly. That men will let themselves be killed where they stand, that is a well-known thing and counted on in every plan of battle. But that men who have retreated for ten days, sleeping on the ground and half dead with fatigue, should be able to take up their rifles and attack when the bugle sounds, is a thing upon which we never counted. It was a possibility not studied in our war academy.

Had the Germans not withdrawn two corps to face the Russians, there might not have been a hole in the line to Kluck's left, and there might have been no space to flank on his right.

    All in all, this was a great book and totally a classic of its genre. Very heavy on politicking among the generals, but that's the point.

Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=188665

Miscellaneous Facts:

  • A good quote from Tuchman: "nothing so comforts the military mind as the maxim of a great general."
  • There was a whole issue years before the war in France when it was proposed that France get rid of the red trousers in its uniform, because they were so visible. But conservatives protested it, and succeeded in keeping the "iconic" red trousers, which caused more casualties in the early days of WWI, when it became obvious that a change was needed.
  • The French Commander-In-Chief Joffre was driven around in a car by Georges Bouillot, the three time winner of the Grand Prix.
  • The Russian state, worried about drunkenness, banned the sale of vodka during the war, which had the negative effect of diminishing state finances, since the Russian government had a monopoly over vodka sales, which made up a third of government income.

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