In this very short book, Unger determines that since there will be no world government anytime soon (both because it is unfeasible and undesirable), it is important to order the world even without any decider of last resort. What Unger believes works best is the system of coalitions of the willing, in which individual countries work with each other in voluntary organizations such as the G7, G20, ASEAN, and others. While the UN can serve as a valuable umbrella under which countries can join together to deal with global risks, the General Assembly is limited by the fact that it is dominated by small individual states without power, and the Security Council by the veto power and the unrepresentativeness of its members. Unger makes an interesting proposal that the Security Council should only have two members: the USA and China, and the rest should be determined by a vote; he would also eliminate veto power and impose rule by supermajority.
There are three types of international organization going forward for Unger that are of use. One is the special-purpose organization, which is a group established by dissimilar countries to solve a specific problem, like solar energy use or air travel regulations. Another is the similar-state coalition, like the G7 or BRICS, in which similarly-situated states can discuss a wide range of issues. And then there are regional coalitions, like the African Union or the Organization of American States, which solve issues in one geographic area over a wide range of topics.
There is also the possibility of a fourth international organization: an entente. This would be an organization in imitation of the 19th century Concert of Europe, an organization in which its members pledge to rally against the aggression of any one state against any other, thereby deterring aggression. This, he says, should be the goal of Europe and the developing states that depend on China and the United States avoiding conflict. These countries, he writes, should rally together to eventually announce an intention to punish any aggressor between the two, using their aggregated power to hopefully prevent a war. Writing of the process to get this done, Unger says, "Liquid before solid: understandings before commitments, and commitments before treaties and international institutions. The statesmen who conceived and implemented concerts among states have always understood the need to advance in this sequence." The end goal would be to govern the use of force and tie down the two largest powers to stop them from fighting each other.
Unger also distinguishes between three historical traditions in how to approach relations among states: the Metternichian, the Wilsonian, and the Bismarckian. As for Metternich, which I understood the best, is the greatest commitment. This system turns "present advantage into vested right" and it is based on stability and legitimacy. Unger writes that its proximate enemy is revolution, and its ultimate enemy is time, since all political constructions eventually fall to dust. Wilsonian tradition seeks universal national self-determination, which it hopes to use as a tool to propagate the values and institutions of the great power(s). It favors pluralism of power, but struggles with conflict between the great powers that can uphold the system and the national interests that seek self-determination. Its chief instruments, writes Unger, are international law and international organization, along with wars that serve as ideological crusades. The Bismarckian tradition tries to avoid the consolidation of hegemony, and tries to prevent any one great power from crowding the others out. It is skeptical about associations between power and ideology, and tries to draw major and minor powers into concerted action, and prefers to concentrate on initiatives in the middle zone between war and law. Unger favors this tradition, and says its greatest strength is its "openness to correction in light of experience and changed circumstance." This last one perplexed be the most since I'm not sure about the historical context of this and it does not comport with my limited understanding of Bismarck. Unger does acknowledge that Bismarckian tradition unfortunately also featured "unaccountable autocrats, secret protocols, and territorial ambitions." Those seem like big things to wave away.
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