The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia by Ian Easton

     I wanted a book about the potential war over Taiwanese freedom and this one fit the bill. Extremely provocative name. I've gotta say it was an extremely good book. Just dense with specific information and well-organized. I felt like Easton clearly knew his stuff and now I am armed with hard knowledge about how Taiwan can defend itself.

    One thing this book makes clear is that China is and has been planning to invade Taiwan. There is no doubt about that. It is the unfinished business of the Chinese Civil War and the centerpiece of the first Pacific island chain that can either serve to lock China in or be a door to Pacific access for the country. Of course, for Taiwanese people, it's their home, and at some point soon they may be forced with the choice to defend it or flee. Easton writes that he addresses the below questions/categories of questions in his book:

1. How do internal Chinese military writings depict the campaign to conquer Taiwan, and what capabilities do they feel are necessary for executing it? How do PLA writings portray their adversary? Where do they see Taiwanese strengths and where do they see weaknesses?

2. How does Taiwan’s military plan to defend the island against Chinese invasion? What capabilities do Taiwanese officers feel are necessary to execute their defense plans? In the worst case, how long could they be expected to hold out before direct American assistance was required?

3. What are the implications for American strategy in Asia? How might policymakers in Washington strengthen Taiwan and prevent China from precipitating a crisis? What might the United States do to better contribute to future peace and stability in this region?

    Originally, China would have invaded Taiwan in the summer of 1950, continuing the war between the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC, China) and the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan). However, in June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea, requiring China to divert its forces and not invade Taiwan. But Easton writes that a Communist invasion of Taiwan seemed unlikely to be successful at that time anyway. Despite being far stronger on land, the Communists were weaker in the air and at sea, with zero experience conducting amphibious and naval warfare. The plan had been to practice for an invasion of Taiwan by assaulting some of the small islands that the Nationalists held, but failed in both attempts, losing over ten thousand troops. Additionally, in March of 1950, the PRC spy network in Taiwan collapsed thanks to a major defection, neutralizing 80 different operations and leading to the arrest of 400 PRC secret agents in Taiwan.

    But even if the PRC had gone ahead to invade Taiwan in 1950 had there been none of the above setbacks, Easton writes that the plan was not that good. PRC plans called for an assault of between 200,000 to 360,000 troops on Taiwan's beaches with a force of 25,000 paratroopers landing behind Taiwanese lines. The plan called for fifteen days and expected 100,000 casualties. But Easton points out that this is incredibly unrealistic. On its face, it seems crazy to expect to win a war in two weeks while also losing between a third and half of your invasion force. Those two things will not both happen. Second, Easton compares the Chinese plan to the American WWII plan of invasion when it was held by Japan and finds the Chinese plan lacking, probably due to the fact that WWII American generals had a huge level of experience in amphibious assaults and the Chinese People's Liberation Army had none. The American plan is not so optimistic to expect a victory in fifteen days. Instead, it called for between 400,000 and 500,000 sailors, soldiers, and Marines to assault the southwestern coast, expecting to fight for three months to gain control over the island. American strategists expected 150,000 casualties. And this was to defeat a force of 100,000 on Taiwan, whereas the PRC would have needed to defeat 500,000 in 1950. So it seems unlikely that the US would have needed more troops and expected more casualties to defeat 100,000 than the PRC would have needed to defeat 500,000 five years later. So all of this is to say that the threat of Chinese invasion in 1950 may have been high had events not intervened, but the chances of Chinese victory were not.

    In one chapter of the book, Easton writes about what the warning signs will be of a Chinese invasion, and categorizes them into five groups of readiness, logistics, recon, propaganda, and subversion. He gives some examples of each:

1. Readiness

• Suspicious leadership meetings (CCP Politburo, CMC, and Eastern Theater Command)
• Establishment of leading small group/joint command for Taiwan (Beijing, Nanjing, and/or Fuzhou areas)
• Field deployments: theater missiles (Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Zhejiang)
• Field deployments: strategic air defense batteries (Fujian, Greater Shanghai, Greater Guangzhou (S-400, S-300, HQ-9))
• Field deployments: army amphibious and airborne units (elements of the 1st, 31st, 12th, and 42nd group armies)
• Field deployments: fighter groups (20 major airbases near Taiwan)
• Mobilization of reserves and militia (Eastern, Southern, Northern, Central theater commands)Amphibious assault drills (Zhoushan, Pingtan, Dongshan)
• Ship and submarine sorties (East Sea Fleet at Ningbo, South Sea Fleet at Zhanjiang)
• Air and sea traffic restrictions (major cities including Shanghai, Hong Kong, Guangzhou, etc.)
• Maritime militia fleet drills (ports of Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong)
• Nuclear testing (Lop Nur nuclear test site)

2. Logistics

• Stockpiling (oil, gas, coal, food, water, medicine, weapons, animals, etc.)
• Blood drives (Fujian and major PLA hospitals across China)
• Defense industrial surge (weapons, munitions, vehicles, aircraft, radios, parachutes, etc.)
• Port expansion surge (from Jiangsu to Hainan)
• Road and rail expansion surge (Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong)
• Airport hardening and resiliency surge (military and civil airfields within 500 miles of Taiwan)
• Shipyard production surge (amphibious assault ships, landing craft, mine sweepers, etc.)Fishing fleets and other commercial ships refitted (military radios, gun riveting, fire-fighting equipment)
• Coastal fortification projects (Fujian’s offshore islands)

3. Recon

• Intelligence ships and aircraft activities (Taiwan Strait area)
• Emergency satellite launches (Xichang, Sichuan, etc.)
• Orbital changes (for increased PLA coverage of Taiwan Strait area)
• Human intelligence operations (worldwide, with special focus on Taiwan and the United States)

4. Propaganda

• Propaganda campaign (strident themes)
• Influence operations (worldwide, with special focus on Taiwan and the United States)
• Diplomatic messaging operations (worldwide, with special focus on the United States and Japan)
• Nuclear blackmail (media and personal contacts)

5. Subversion

• Sabotage (financial, transportation/electric grid, water/fuel supplies)Abduction or assassination attempts (president of Taiwan and other key leaders and their families)
• Gang-related violence (Taiwanese night clubs, prison breaks, police station attacks)
• Violent protests, rioting, strikes (near Presidential Office Building in Taipei)
• Smuggling and infiltration (gun-running, intelligence agents in Taiwan)

    The geography of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait is highly favorable to Taiwan. At its narrowest point, the Taiwan Strait is just 80 miles across, and becomes a wind tunnel thanks to Taiwanese mountains. The wind is so strong that trees on the Penghu Islands are stunted and grow wide rather than tall, since they would otherwise be uprooted. The waves are also strong, and there are "militarily significant waves" of over four feet 97% of the year. Due to the typhoon season, there are only eight good weeks to make a full crossing of the Strait, from late March to late April and from late September to late October, when winds are light and waves are low.

    Easton estimates that the PLA would send a million troops in an invasion of Taiwan, but that the number could be as low as 300,000. I think both of these numbers are low, although a million makes more sense. If Taiwan is able to mobilize its reserves, that adds over 200,000 defenders in a short period of time (days). But I am not sure how effective they are expected to be. The Taiwanese plan to respond to a Chinese invasion, the Gu'an Plan, contemplates scenarios as bad as US forces never arriving, US forces being too late to make a difference, and US forces being defeated. Easton writes that this separates Taiwanese strategy from South Korean and Japanese strategies, which are much more reliant on American support. But, according to a former Taiwanese defense minister, if American forces do not send support in the first thirty days, Taiwan is likely to succumb to the initial invasion and need to fight a guerrilla war.

    Easton recommends that Taiwan should focus on developing stronger counterstrike abilities to raise the cost of a Chinese invasion to the people of China, engineer more projects to fortify Taiwan and the islands it controls, and also further develop electronic warfare capabilities to make sure Taiwan's eyes and ears aren't blacked out in a war.

Miscellaneous Facts:

• The Communists were losing to the Nationalists throughout most of the Chinese Civil War, which had started in 1927, until 1948, when they won several victories and all but won the war in 1949, lacking control only in Taiwan.
• In January 1950, Dean Acheson (SecState) announced that Korea was out of the US defense perimeter in Asia, leading to the Korean War. But that same announcement also stated Taiwan would not be in the US defense perimeter, stoking Chinese aggression.
• The PLA used to shell Kinmen Island on odd-numbered days for twenty years from 1958-79. Taiwan hit them back on even-numbered days, and no harm was done apparently on either side. War is dumb.
• US President Jimmy Carter switched recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979 to try to align the US with China against the USSR.
• Taiwan has 23 million people and is about the size of Belgium.
• Apparently Taiwan has the capabilities to pump gasoline through pipes under their beaches to create an oil slick on the sea and then light that on fire as Chinese invaders arrive.
• Taipei is 390 miles from Okinawa, 420 from Shanghai, 500 from Hong Kong, 720 from Manila, and 5,000 miles from Honolulu.