Reflection on War on Peace: The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence by Ronan Farrow

               War on Peace reads like an extended article and is really closer to journalism than the history books I usually read. It was a really engaging book because of the way that it is novelistic in its descriptions of people and events. Farrow gives you a lot of scene-building so that you get a picture of the characters and understand them really well.

               The book focuses on the last 15-20 years or so of American foreign policy and covers the changes in the Department of State during that period. Mainly, he addresses a change from “talk first, shoot later” to the opposite. Especially in the Trump administration, the diplomatic corps has been weakened, and with it, American power and influence. The main characters are the author and the diplomats he meets in the Foreign Service as well as the higher-ups he interviewed to write the book. The book is kind of unfocused, so this post will be as well.

               In an interview with Kissinger, the former National Security Counsel (I think) states that often it is more tempting for the President to seek the advice of the NSC because they’re in the same building, while the Secretary of State is several blocks away. Kissinger responds to the major theme of the book, the decline of the State Department, by stating that new institutions have arisen in its place, though the author points out that the new institutions (the military, mainly) are not doing the “thoughtful, holistic foreign policy analysis” that State once provided. Kissinger also touched on the American failure in Vietnam. He contrasted the application of containment principles in Europe and in Asia. In Europe, the societies being protected from Communism had existed for hundreds of years and were more or less stable. In Vietnam on the other hand, the state was new and weaker. European societies had just come off of a several-hundred-year hot streak where they competed and strengthened armies and states. Vietnam hadn’t had that experience.

               The book also covers the situation of American relations with Pakistan in depth, the relationship being dominated by the US supply of funds in exchange for cooperation in the War in Afghanistan. The relationship began when Iran, the US’s former big Central Asian ally, overthrew the Shah and stopped being a US ally. The US settled on Pakistan and the relationship began with Pakistan helping the US help the Afghans to throw the Soviets out of Afghanistan. However, this resulted in 40 years of strengthening the Pakistani army at the expense of the civilian state. The too-strong army overthrew civilian governments and also funded terrorist groups that attached India. The major problem that Farrow says the relationship has is that America uses Pakistan purely tactically but doesn’t let them in on strategic planning. That means that Pakistan knows short-term needs, like that the USA needs to use drones in this sector this month, but it doesn’t know what the end goal in Afghanistan is. The US probably doesn’t know either. What’s crazy to me is how much money a lot of State officials wanted to pump into Afghanistan, a blatantly corrupt country that in my opinion has problems that far outweigh its value. Pakistan funds terrorism and is and Islamic fundamentalist nuclear state that constantly harasses India, the largest free democracy in the world. Even after all our aid to Pakistan, the people hate America and we have to send all our aid through NGOs that won’t show our flag.

               I’d recommend this book to anybody interested in foreign policy or anyone joining the Foreign Service. It’s a short read at about 300 pages and not dry at all. I agree with the author that the United States needs to rebuild its diplomatic forces because those investments save a lot of money. I also agree that we need to dedicate ourselves more strongly to human rights, recognizing that there are certain situations where once you insert yourself, atrocities will be committed. Part of committing to human rights is understanding that you cannot be the world policeman. Once you are in a war, your country will kill men, women, and children. That is what war is. That’s why it’s so bad. The idea of looking out for human rights in a war is a total oxymoron. Don’t go to war unless someone else attacks you first and continues to pose a threat to you. If you conquer, you will kill, enslave, and torture. It’s unavoidable and it’s what’s happened in Afghanistan.