For this reading of The Federalist Papers, I used Clinton Rossiter's list of the essentials, which amounts to 21 of the 85 articles. They are Federalist #'s 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 23, 37, 39, 47, 48, 49, 51, 62, 63, 70, 78, 84, 85. Of The Federalist Papers, 51 articles were written by Alexander Hamilton, 29 by James Madison, and 5 by John Jay. Of those that I read, 10 were written by Hamilton, 10 were written by Madison, and 1 was written by Jay.
In Federalist #10, Madison discusses factionalism, asserting that "the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS." Factions that do not amount to a majority are discounted, as they can "clog the administration," but not "convulse the society." Majority factions, however, are far more dangerous because they can direct the democratic government in their favored direction. This doesn't seem particularly offensive in the modern day since, duh, that's how a democratic republic works, but I guess I get the fear in 1788. In Federalist #14, Madison distinguishes a democracy from a republic in that a democracy is what we refer to today as direct democracy, administering the government themselves, and a republic is just representative government, defined in #39. His answer to this "problem" of majoritarian rule is to use representative democracy, instead of direct democracy, to make sure the majority does what is "right." He also argues in #10 that, contrary to then-common misconception, a republic works better over larger territory and population than smaller. Madison asserts that in smaller groups, it is easier to get a majority and to execute plans, whereas over a larger population, it is more difficult to "concert and execute their plans of oppression." Something else interesting that Madison points out in #14 is that almost every state had some frontier to the west, and that therefore they all needed each other's protection. The threat of war with Native Americans created a force favoring more federal authority. It also makes sense to favor a federal authority since the states expanding westwards would have been drawn into conflict with each other and would've gone to war without some higher regulating authority.
In #15, Hamilton addresses the primary deficiency of the Articles of Confederation, which is that contributions by the states were voluntary. With this, states gave less and less to the national government until it was effectively unfunded. "Each State, yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or convenience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins." Continuing in #16, Hamilton points out that only the federal government can discipline states, which lack the power to discipline each other. States could try to do so, but ultimately have no levers to pull except those that we are familiar with in international relations today, such as war or sanctions. The federal government can rule the states by law. The states can only rule one another by force. Moreover, there is a threat of inaction on the part of the states when a federal act requires state enforcement, as the Articles of Confederation required. States need only not act or act evasively to defeat federal measures under the Articles, defeating the purpose of a national government.
I thought that #23, by Hamilton, was the clearest argument for a strong national government. In it, Hamilton gives four reasons to create a national government: "the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries." These basically come out to national defense, interstate policing of rebellions, and regulation of interstate and international commerce. In order to establish the national defense, the national government must raise armies and fleets and then support and manage them. He goes on to say that (and the capital letters are his, not mine): "These powers ought to exist without limitation, BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORESEE OR DEFINE THE EXTENT AND VARIETY OF NATIONAL EXIGENCIES, OR THE CORRESPONDENT EXTENT AND VARIETY OF THE MEANS WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO SATISFY THEM." He continues that, "The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. The power ought to be coextensive with all possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to preside over the common defense." I think this is a forceful and strong argument for a strong national government.
In #51, Madison discusses the structure of the new government, and extolls the virtues of its checks and balances. In this one, we get the famous quote: "But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflection on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." It is critical, when establishing a strong national government, to tie it to the will of the people, so that that majority will is what sets policy. However, what is interesting is that Madison views the legislature as the predominating branch of government that has to be restrained. In the 21st century, most people would say it is the executive that predominates, as Congress is mostly dysfunctional and takes cues from the President. I wonder if this might result from an overcorrection, as implemented by dividing the legislature into two houses. Hamilton, in #70, however, emphasizes "energy in the executive" in creating good government: "It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy." He goes on to emphasize the importance of embodying the executive in one person, rather than multiple, so as to more easily determine who is to credit and who to blame for actions of the government. In a system with two consuls, or a multi-person judiciary, it is harder to figure out who should be voted out of office. However, one unanticipated consequence of the Constitution is that I think the separation of powers may have the same effect, where people vote out the President for things that Congress did and vice versa. In addressing the judiciary in #78, Hamilton also anticipates Marbury v. Madison, pointing out that the Constitution restricts legislative authority, and that such restrictions must be preserved by a judiciary, "whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing."
I'm glad I finally read The Federalist Papers, and I found it really interesting to see which portions totally apply today and which are less applicable with the passage of time. It is so interesting to see the founders arguing for a new government based on comparisons to ancient republics in Rome, Greece, and medieval Italy. Additionally, I find it really impactful how the articles are so totally in favor of a strong central government. I knew that would be the case, but I found it even more in favor of central government than I anticipated since do many originalists are so in favor of power for the states.
78 hamilton
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