Reflections on Battle: A History of Combat and Culture by John A. Lynn

Battle is book with an interesting premise. It’s a history of war but from a cultural perspective, meaning that it talks about some specific battles and tactics but always in the context of how different societies viewed them. Foe example, Middle Ages knights viewed archers and crossbowmen with contempt, but in ancient India, the bowmen were the most honored on the battlefield. The book covers different periods and locations, from classical warfare in Greece, China, and India to the scourge of global terrorism today. The chapters I found the most interesting were on Egyptian military doctrine from the first war against Israel in 1948 until the October War of 1973 and the chapter on the role of cultural differences in the war in the Pacific in World War 2.

“Perfected Warfare”

One theme throughout the book is the concept of perfecting warfare to become a perfect form of combat. The Greeks developed many rules about the conduct of war and battles, essentially restricting it to being fought in the open plains and valleys of Greece, not the mountains, and limiting the number of missile weapons used. In the Middle Ages, Christians developed a sort of “perfected warfare” in the crusades by fighting Muslims, making conflict religious, a guarantor of heaven. Also in the Middle Ages, knights developed the tournament, where they jousted and fought in melees and were rewarded with kisses from ladies. The author calls this the most perfected warfare as it is completely controlled and filled with feasts etc.

The Evolution of Modern Warfare

One of the most interesting features of the book is where it covers the changes from the 18^th to 19^th centuries in warfare, which featured the rise of the citizen army over professional armies. The professional armies themselves, as ruled by Louis XIV-XVI, Frederick of Prussia, and other leaders developed out of the small forces led by aristocrats in the Middle Ages and were still dominated by aristocratic officer who paid for their own units’ existences. There was contempt for common soldiers, as one French minister of war referred to them as the “slime of the nation.”

In these forces, combat was dominated by packed together units of soldiers alternately firing. This happened to prevent soldiers from deserting and to concentrate fire. Weapons were still not accurate as to force soldiers to hide behind cover. The big shift to soldiers becoming skirmishers hiding behind cover was thanks to the “levee on masse,” when all single, young, French men were called to service, doubling the size of the French military and providing French generals (including Napoleon) with a motivated and large force that was less prone to desertion. With this, they would spread out and take cover to fire at enemy forces.

Egypt and Israel

The chapter on Egypt was really interesting to me because it felt very connected to modern day and is deals with an area I’m particularly interested in. After the Six-Day War, Egyptian and Jordanian military forces explicitly reflected that the origin of their problems lay in Arab culture. This happened in a few ways. One was that Arab officers did not want to admit the shame of defeat or at least wanted to mitigate it so they would exaggerate Israeli troop numbers or not even tell their superiors they were defeated at all. The problem was so bad that in the more successful Egyptian effort in the October War, they got their information by tapping into Israeli comms, as the Israelis had the better information about Egyptian troop movements than Egyptians themselves. Another Arab cultural issue that came to the fore was a deference to authority to a fault. Unlike in American military culture, where junior officers are highly encouraged to take initiative and are given much flexibility, Egyptian officers seemed incapable of doing so. They wouldn’t even move tanks during combat, stopping them like stationary pillboxes instead of maneuvering around their enemies. The Egyptians cleverly accounted for this by planning their October 1973 operation to the most minute details, leaving no room for error. They ran the same drills for months in full view of the Israelis so that when the final, real buildup came, the Israelis didn’t expect an actual invasion and the Egyptians had each practiced their part a million times.

Interestingly, we can look at the October War as a victory for both Egypt and Israel as the victory satisfied Egyptian pride and gave Sadat the political capital to negotiate a true peace with Israel with recognition and all. It was a military stalemate that ended up granting political victory to both sides.this

Conclusion

Overall the book was good though a little wordy and academic at points. He also made what I thought was a really picky distinction about cultural differences and racism and what affected what in the Pacific Theater of WWII. It was overall good and a few chapters would probably make good reading for a college class but otherwise this book is pretty esoteric.

Miscellaneous Facts:

• The West’s military revolutions
• The breeding and harnessing of horses for war
• The transition from bronze to iron
• The evolution of the war galley
• The refining of gunpowder and guns
• And the arrival of the broadside firing vessel
• Marine Corps tactics are heavily influenced by Chinese war literature
• In 1960, Literacy in Egypt was 26 percent, 15 percent in Iraq, and 36 percent in Syria. By 1990, however, Egypt was up to 48 percent, Iraq at 60, and Syria at 64.
• At 2:40 pm on September 11^th, Rumsfeld was already talking about going after Iraq. George Bush pressed analysts who told him there was no connection to find a connection on the very next day.
• In April 2003 53% of Americans thought Saddam Hussein was personally involved in 9/11 and by September that number was at 69%. W has gotta be one of the worst leaders of any country ever.
• Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 brought less than half the American troops to Iraq that Desert Storm had in 1991.